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directed toward an identifiable group of victims: cheerleaders. Even
though the speech is targeted at a group of students, the speech must
be unwelcome and interfere with at least one individual out of such
group in order to constitute cyberbullying.
It bears repeating that school districts must carefully balance all
four factors of this proposed test. Indeed, the crux of this test is- the
requirement that schools weigh each factor equally. Only then can we
protect the victims of cyberbullying while upholding students' freedom of speech.
CONCLUSION

The four-factor sliding scale test proposed in this Note is a practical method for resolving the unique problem of cyberbullying facing
schools today. This test provides enough flexibility to apply to different scenarios within the ever-expanding social network scene, while
also ensuring consistent application within school communities and
lower courts. Furthermore, the test incorporates well-accepted and
well-defined principles from Title VII and Title IX while preserving
the policy underpinnings of the Tinker tetralogy.
Most importantly, this test is designed to protect the victim by
providing an avenue of recourse before the damage from cyberbullying becomes irreparable. Indeed, as the Harris Court made clear, "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." 186 The same is true of this proposed test. The cases
of Megan Meier and Tyler Clementi 187 are tragic reminders of what
can happen when a cyberbully' s psychological torment proceeds unchecked. This test serves as a preventive tool. It empowers students
and schools alike to take action before the victim becomes tomorrow's
next tragic headline.
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187

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
See supra Part I.

ANTITRUST AND PATENT LICENSE
AGREEMENTS: A NEW LOOK AT
THE GRANTBACK CLAUSE IN HIGH
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS
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"[W] e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for
the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits,
and the reward of their ingenuity and labor; the other, that the world
may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be
retarded. " 1
INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, high technology has been a significant
driver of economic growth in the United States. 2 Businesses are increasingly turning to patented technology and innovation to streamline
operations, boost output, or reach new markets. 3 However, few firms
develop their own technology for internal use only, and technological
development frequently relies on the inventions of others. Rather,
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B.A., University of Colorado at Boulder. The author would like to thank Professor
Jacqueline D. Lipton for her suggestions on earlier drafts, and Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.
for his invaluable instruction in Antitrust Law and guidance in the drafting of this
Note. All mistakes are the author's alone.
1
Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (K.B.) (Lord Mansfield,
C.J.).
2
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology Competition, 44 WM. & MARYL. REv. 65, 67 (2002) [hereinafter High Technology
Competition]; Jacob M. Schlesinger, Greenspan Warns on Productivity Gains-Fed
Chairman Says Benefits From High Technology Could Soon Reach Limit, WALL ST.
J., June 15, 1999, at A2 (discussing Alan Greenspan's comments on the role that high
technology has played in U.S. economic growth in the 1990s: cutting production costs
in almost every economic sector, boosting output, and restraining price increases).
3
See Matt Murray & Raju Narisetti, Bank Mergers' Hidden Engine: Technology, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at Bl (discussing the impact of high technology
on banks' operations).
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licensing plays a critical role in facilitating the development and application of technology to various businesses and industries. 4 Innovators in high technology who license their patented innovations rely, in
part, on patent protection when implementing, disseminating, or developing their technology for various applications or processes. 5 A
key tool in protecting patent rights is the grantback clause, also known
as the improvement clause. Grantback clauses allow licensors to prevent licensees from displacing their patents from the marketplace
through improvements that the licensee may independently practice. 6
But grantback clauses raise important antitrust concerns that federal courts, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of
Justice (the "Agencies") have attempted to regulate over the last half
century. Generally, courts and the Agencies have treated grantback
clauses as potential contracts in restraint of trade under Section 1 of
7
the Sherman Act, the legality of which is determined through one of
two analytical frameworks called the per se rule and the "rule of reason."8
The central claim of this Note is that neither framework in its traditional form is correct for analyzing grantback clauses in patent license agreements. Courts appropriately barred the per se rule from the
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See, e.g., Rodney Ho, Patents Hit Record in '98 as Tech Firms Rushed to
Protect Intellectual Property, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1999, at A2 (stating that "IBM
pulled in more than $1 billion in licensing fees [in 1998] from 1,600 different companies.").
5
Id. ("The number of patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office is skyrocketing as giant technology companies scrable to shelter their intellectual property in today's tech-crazed marketplace.").
6
See, e.g. Kenneth J. Dow & Traci Dreher Quigley, Improvements for Handling Improvement Clauses in IP Licenses: An Analytical Framework, 20 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 577, 582 (2004) (describing a particular grantback clause as requiring "any improvements made on the apparatus or process" as
belonging to the original patent holder of the apparatus or process); Barry Rein, Permission Granted, MACHINE DESIGN, Mar. 7, 1996, at 143 ("Many licenses ... have
grantback provisions in which a company licenses a technology in exchange for
granting back to the licensor rights to use any technology it develops.").
7
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
8
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24
(1940) (describing the per se rule as an automatic prohibition of certain conduct, such
as horizontal price-fixing and territorial restraints, because no business justification
could vindicate its anticompetitive effects); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (introducing the rule ofreason to antitrust analysis, and
requiring that under the rule, courts only strike down unreasonable restraints on trade
as determined through a holistic view of the relevant market, and balancing anticompetitive effects of the restraint with procompetitive effects).

301

grantback context over sixty years ago, 9 but it has had a few resurgent
moments since. The per se rule, however, fails to appreciate the significant procompetitive effects grantback clauses have in high technology competition. 10 The rule of reason, on the other hand, is a nebulous and often imprecise approach to agreements spawning from different markets with different motivations. 11 Also, the rule of reason
often requires great expense for the litigating parties, as well as for the
courts or Agencies analyzing the challenged contracts. 12 Finally, the
current form of the rule of reason does not appropriately account for
the unique dynamics of high technology markets that licensing parties
must consider in making accurate and economically beneficial deci•

SlOnS.

13

This Note proposes that federal courts and the Agencies should
create a more tailored approach to analyzing potential anticompetitive
effects of grantback clauses in patent license agreements. 14 Rather
than mechanically applying the rule of reason-or contemplating a
return to the per se rule-courts and the Agencies should carefully
analyze the context in which the grantback clause exists.
Instead, every patent license agreement can be treated as a joint
venture since license agreements generally contemplate two or more
entities collaborating, through contract for the furtherance of some
commercial objective. 15 Joint ventures exist either upstream or downstream of the relevant market. In other words, a joint venture exists
either for the collection and development of raw materials or the production, marketing, or sale to consumers of some product already developed from raw materials. 16 Patent license agreements are similar:
the patented technology is licensed either to assist in the development
of new products, technologies, or processes from raw materials, or the
production of the same to be placed in the market. 17
The anticompetitive effect of grantback clauses in such license
agreements truly depends on which type of joint venture the license
9

See Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co, 329 U.S. 637

(1947).
10

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.
12
See infra Part III.B.
13
See infra Part III.
14
See infra Part IV.
15
See infra Part IV.
16
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among Competitors, 86 lowAL. REV. 113 7, 1171 (2001) [hereinafter Collaborations] ("Joint ventures may be formed at the purchasing, research and development,
production, or marketing stages of the production cycle.").
17
See infra Part IV.
11
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agreement contemplates. Upstream joint ventures are inherently less
anticompetitive and more procompetitive because they are further
from the marketplace, increase innovation and collaboration, and generally do not restrain the joint venturers from competing with one
another outside of the joint venture. 18 Downstream joint ventures have
a much higher potential for anticompetitive effects for the converse
reasons: they are closer to the market and are thus more likely to re19
strain output and induce monopolistic or cartelistic behavior. Thus,
courts and the Agencies should evaluate the legality of grantback
clauses based upon the type of joint venture in which they exist, and
determine whether the grantback would change the presumption of
legality in an upstream joint venture, or further the anticompetitive
potential in a downstream joint venture. 20 This proposed contextual
analysis would reduce the overly-broad market analysis required by
the traditional rule of reason, and act as a shortcut to the bottom-line
inquiry of every antitrust suit: "whether or not the challenged restraint
. . ,,21
enhances competlt10n.
Part I of this Note discusses the background of patent license
agreements and grantback clauses. Part II then discusses the historical
antitrust treatment of grantback clauses by federal courts and the
Agencies, focusing specifically on the seminal case Transparent22
Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. and its progeny. Part III
argues that the traditional per se rule and the rule of reason are inappropriate for grantback clauses in patent license agreements because
of the unique structure of high technology markets, the misunderstanding of grantback clauses' procompetitive effects inherent in the
per se rule, and the unduly burdensome and unnecessary expense that
the rule of reason requires. Finally, Part IV suggests that courts and
the Agencies reshape their traditional rule of reason analysis and take
a more nuanced look at whether the challenged grantback clause exists in an upstream or downstream joint venture, and whether the
18

See Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178 (describing upstream joint
ventures as not being close to the marketplace and therefore being less likely to cause
anticompetitive effects).
19
See Id. (describing how "joint ventures at the production and marketing
stages have the greatest potential to cause anticompetitive effects.").
20 See Id. at 117 6-78 (articulating the correct process by which courts should
analyze the legality of joint ventures).
21
See California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1999)
("Whether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption [under the per se rule]
or actual market analysis [under the rule ofreason], the essential inquiry remains the
same-whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.") (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
22
329 U.S. 637 (1947).
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clause has a beneficial or adverse effect on the joint venture's anticompetitive analysis.

I. BACKGROUND ON GRANTBACK CLAUSES IN PATENT
LICENSE AGREEMENTS

A patent is a government-created, legal right to the exclusive possession of an invention. 23 Those who invent new and useful devices,
machinery, or processes are granted a right to exclude all others from
using or practicing those inventions. 24 Therefore, patent protection
encourages innovation. 25 In exchange for the disclosure of novel, useful and nonobvious inventions, 26 the United States offers the patentee
23
A long-standing principle of patent law is that a patent does not grant a
patentee the right to use or practice the patented invention or discovery, but only
grants the right to exclude others from using or practicing the invention or discovery.
See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) ("[T]he longsettled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention."); Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro
Italia SPA, 944 F.2d 870, 879 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("It is elementary that a patent
grants only the right to exclude others and confers no right on its holder to make, use,
or sell."); 1 MoY'S WALKER ON PATENTS§ 1:1 (4th ed. 2010); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 19 (2007) (discussing the history and modem usage of the term "patent.").
24
See 3 5 U.S. C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.").
25
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51
(1989) ("The federal patent system ... embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a
period of years."). Innovation is at the heart of both intellectual property law and, less
directly, antitrust law, and is perhaps the only reason that these bodies of law harmonize. Courts and the Agencies early considered intellectual property law and antitrust
law incompatible with each other because the former granted rights of exclusion,
while the later sought to eliminate exclusive conduct that harmed competition. See
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(noting that "the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at
encouraging innovation, industry and competition"); Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2000)
(describing that courts and enforcement agencies once believed that intellectual property law and antitrust law had an adversarial relationship, but that this belief is now
outdated); Azam H. Aziz, Defining Technology and Innovation Markets: The DOJ's
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing ofIntellectual Property, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv.
475, 482 (1995) (submitting that "a thorough analysis of the underlying reasoning
behind each set of laws reveals that both intellectual property privileges and antitrust
statutes share the common goal of increasing competition and innovation.").
26
The Patent and Trademark Office awards patents only to those inventions
that are new, that have a minimum level of efficacy such that one "skilled in the art"
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(one who obtains a patent) a right to control and use the results of its
labor for a limited period of time. 27 Without an exclusive right to
make, use, or sell an invention for commercial benefit, society could
.c.
.
.
2s
expect .tewer
peopl e to mvent
or mnovate.
Therefore, a patent's value is largely in the patentee's exclusive
right to practice and disseminate its technology or process. But, this
exclusive power may be taken from the patentee in several ways. The
most obvious end of a patentee's exclusive right over its invention or
discovery is the patent's expiration. Under current law, utility and
plant patents expire twenty years after the date when the patent is
filed. 29 Design patents-which protect new, original, and ornamental
design for a physical good-are awarded for fourteen years, measured
from the date the patent is granted. 30
The development of improvements or substitutes for a patented
invention may also weaken a patent's exclusivity right. Because patented inventions become public knowledge after a patent application
is filed, any interested party may modify or alter the invention to improve upon it or substitute it altogether, and may obtain a separate
patent for the improvement. 31 In fact, competitors are often incentivized to do so when the invention is an important asset in a competitive

may use the invention without much difficulty, and that advance on prior technology
in more than an obvious direction. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, ROBERT CLARE
HIGHLEY, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATEN LAW BASICS § 8.2
(2011).
27
See Patlex Corp. v. Mossingho:ff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("The basic right concomitant to the grant of a patent is the right of exclusivity
founded in the Constitution .... The encouragement of investment-based risk is the
fundamental purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude.").
28
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (discussing the
important role patent law has in inducing innovation and invention of novel, useful,
and nonobvious technology or systems); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The
Inducement Standard ofPatentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011) (discussing how
the inducement standard of patent law serves as an economic cornerstone of patent
law).
29
35 U.S.C. §§ 154-157, 163 (2006).
30
Id.§§ 171-173.
31
See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 429 (1822) (The patent "also gives
to any inventor of an improvement in the principle of any machine, or in the process
of any composition of matter which has been patented, an exclusive right to
a patent for his improvement; but [the inventor of an improvement] is not to be at
liberty to use the original discovery, nor is the first inventor at liberty to use the improvement."). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics ofImprovement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 991 (1997) ("Improvers are free to use material that is in the public domain ... by 'designing around'.the claims of a patent.").
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32

marketplace. Alternatively, improvements may be made when a
patentee licenses its patent to others for a particular use, and the licensor discovers or creates an improvement on the original patent. 33 Patent holders grant licenses for several reasons: to earn a royalty on the
use of their invention by others; to combine their technology with the
technology of another in a joint venture context; or "because they do
not have the resources to achieve full commercial exploitation of their
intellectual property themselves." 34
Consequently, a patentee has an obvious interest in controlling
any improvements on its patented technology or process developed by
35
other parties. Where a patentee licenses its invention to a third party,
it will often include a grantback clause in the license agreement, requiring the licensee to "grant back" to the patentee some or all rights
to any improvements made upon the original patent. 36 A grantback
provision often acts as partial consideration for the right to license the
patented technology. 37 Without such consideration, a patentee may
32

See Lemley, supra note 31, at 1005 ("Trying something new in the hope of
improving on an existing product or process is an integral part of the competitive
process."). See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
160 (1989) ("The duplication of boat hulls and their component parts may be an essential part of innovation in the field of hydrodynamic design. Variations as to size
and combination of various elements may lead to significant advances in the field.
Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public domain often
leads to significant advances in technology. If Florida may prohibit this particular
method of study and recomposition of an unpatented article, we fail to see the principle that would prohibit a State from banning the use of chromatography in the reconstitution ofunpatented chemical compounds, or the use of robotics in the duplication
of machinery in the public domain. Moreover, as we noted in Kewanee, the competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an incentive to develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability.")
33
See generally Jay Pil Choi, A Dynamic Analysis ofLicensing: The "Boomerang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses, 43 INT'LECON. REv. 803, 803-04 (2002)
("Licensing is a voluntary form of dissemination whereby an inventor can enjoy at
least some of the gains to trade by availing other parties of the use of his superior
knowledge .... ").
34
Id. at 803.
35
Richard Schmalbeck, The Validity of Grant-Back Clauses in Patent Licensing Agreements, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 733, 733 (1975). See also PHILLIPE. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ifl 782e (3rd ed. 2011) ("An important
concern of the original patentee is the defensive one of not being pushed out of its
own market."); Gerard F. Dunne, Anti-Competitive Considerations ofPatent Accumulation by Licensee Grant-Back Provisions, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 124, 129 (1975)
("The inventor of a parent patent has an interest in preserving his access to technological improvements in his field.").
36
See, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 35 ("A so-called grantback tenn in a patent
license requires the licensee to convey to the original patentee rights under any improvement patent made by the licensee on the licensed invention.").
37
Schmalbeck, supra note 35.
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(one who obtains a patent) a right to control and use the results of its
labor for a limited period of time. 27 Without an exclusive right to
make, use, or sell an invention for commercial benefit, society could
expect fewer people to invent or innovate. 28
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may use the invention without much difficulty, and that advance on prior technology
in more than an obvious direction. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, ROBERT CLARE
HIGHLEY, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATEN LAW BASICS § 8.2
(2011).
27
See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("The basic right concomitant to the grant of a patent is the right of exclusivity
founded in the Constitution .... The encouragement of investment-based risk is the
fundamental purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude.").
28
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (discussing the
important role patent law has in inducing innovation and invention of novel, useful,
and nonobvious technology or systems); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The
Inducement Standard ofPatentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011) (discussing how
the inducement standard of patent law serves as an economic cornerstone of patent
law).
29
35 U.S.C. §§ 154-157, 163 (2006).
30
Id. §§ 171-173.
31
See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 429 (1822) (The patent "also gives
to any inventor of an improvement in the principle of any machine, or in the process
of any composition of matter which has been patented, an exclusive right to
a patent for his improvement; but [the inventor of an improvement] is not to be at
liberty to use the original discovery, nor is the first inventor at liberty to use the improvement."). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics ofImprovement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tux. L. REv. 989, 991 (1997) ("Improvers are free to use material that is in the public domain ... by 'designing around'. the claims of a patent.").
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marketplace. 32 Alternatively, improvements may be made when a
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to any improvements made upon the original patent. 36 A grantback
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find itself "pushed out of its own market. " 38 For example, "a patentee
licenses product patent A; by practicing the invention, the licensee
learns how to do it better and obtains product patent B. If the improvement is significant, it may destroy any market for the patentee's
original product. " 39
Grantback clauses vary from one license agreement to anotherthey are purely contractual obligations between parties-but have
some general commonalities. Grantback clauses may include: a) a
nonexclusive license with or without royalties flowing to either the
licensor or licensee to practice the improvement; b) an exclusive license to use or sublicense the improvement; or c) an all-out assignment of the improved technology, which is usually patented separately
by the licensee, "without any right reserved for the [licensee]." 40 Under a nonexclusive license agreement, both the licensor and licensee
may practice the improvement and license it to others. 41 Under an
exclusive license, the licensor may practice the improvement and license it to others, but the licensee may only practice the improvement.
It may not license it to others. Finally, under a complete assignment,
the licensee may not practice the improvement at all except by a second license from the original licensor. 42
General commentary views grantbacks as both beneficial and detrimental to competitive markets and innovation. They are beneficial in
that they incentivize the dissemination of important technology. 43 For
example, the patentee is encouraged to license its technology if it is
reasonably certain that it will not be driven from the market by subsequent improvements. The patentee may realize this benefit in two
ways: a) by having the ability to practice the improvement; orb) by
receiving royalties when the licensee, or another third party, practices
the improvement. However, if grantback clauses in patent license
agreements were not available, or the law was unduly restrictive (e.g.
requiring licensors to permit licensee's to further disseminate the improvements to third parties), patentees would be less likely to license
their technology, and instead would seek other alternatives to develop
38

AREEDA, supra note 35.
Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43
See 2 HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAw § 23: 1
(2011) (stating that "absent the protection of a grant-back provision, patent owners
may be justifiably reluctant to license their patented technology to firms that can then
develop and exclusively retain improvement technology made possible by the licenses
.... By removing this risk, reasonable grant-back provisions enhance the patentee's
incentive to license, thus opening up the patented technology to additional firms.").
39
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their technology, such as angel investors, venture capital incubators,
or bank loans. 44 Thus, without grantback clauses, important technology might not be disseminated between firms. Dissemination of technology can have important competitive effects that should not be discounted, 45 particularly in high technology markets.
As discussed in Part III below, high-technology industries are
unique from other markets in that they progress more rapidly and tend
to unify around a single dominant player. 46 If a dominant patentee in a
high technology market refused to disseminate its technology because
it could not employ a grantback clause, and thus feared being replaced
anytime it licensed, other competitors in the market would suffer the
most. For example, suppose a national telecommunication firm refused to license new wireless technology, used in transmitting data
between phones and computers, to third party software developers.
Instead, the company developed its own software, or bought softwaredeveloping firms as subsidiaries. The telecommunication firm would
thereby maintain control over its patented technology, and resist disseminating its new technology to outsiders. Such conduct would increase the company's monopoly position, slow innovation, further
concentrate the market, and erect incredibly high entry barriers to any
firm wishing to compete with the telecommunication firm. Grantback
clauses defuse such scenarios and benefit innovation and competition
by promoting the spread of patented technology, indirectly disincentivizing monopolistic behavior, and allowing new market entrants an
opportunity to learn from the dominant firm in a high technology
market. 47
Conversely, the Agencies believe that grantback clauses could stifle innovation and market competition by allowing the patentee, or
licensor, to retain a monopoly over certain technology through the
44
While these alternatives may require a patentee to give up certain proprietary rights in its technology similar to a license agreement, there is arguably a reduced
chance that the angel investor, venture capitalist or bank will force the patentee out of
the market. Such financiers' economic interest is tied to the patentee's success. A
licensee, on the other hand, may desire to compete with the patentee, or at least advance its own interests while standing on the patentee's shoulders without regard to
whether the patentee falls in the process.
45
See generally Lemley, supra note 31, at 998 (stating that the "rules governing improvements are important in understanding the extent to which protection
for first-generation innovation will impede improvement in subsequent generations.").
46
See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 74-76.
47
See International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551, 566
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (stating that a system oflicense agreements with grantback clauses
"assure[ d] that improvements w[ ould] be disseminated throughout the long list of
[defendant's] licensees" with a net effect of increasing rather than decreasing competition).
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grantback, or by allowing the patentee to extend its monopoly to
48
technology not within the scope of the original patent. In the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (the
"Guidelines"), the Agencies state that grantbacks could reduce a licensee's incentive to engage in research and development when they
know that they will not have an exclusive monopoly to the result of
their work, but will instead have to share such results with the original
patentee. 49 This may be especially true where improvements are assigned back to the original patentee, but may also occur in exclusive
grantback agreements. 50
From an antitrust perspective, exclusive grantback clauses are
suspect for another reason. Because exclusive grantbacks generally
prohibit one or all parties to a licensing agreement from further licensing the improvements to other third parties, such grantbacks could
create a barrier to entry in the market. 51 Since the patentee holds the
original patent and the licensee holds the improvement patent, a third
party seeking access to such technology must go to both parties and
52
negotiate separate licensing agreements with differing terms of use.
48

See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE CoMM'N, ANT\TRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THELICENSINGOFINTELLECTUALPROPERTY 30 (1995) [hereinifter Guidelines] (stating that grantback clauses may adversely affect competition).
49 Id.
50
Proving that a grantback clause reduced a licensee's incentive to innovate
may be particularly difficult in an antitrust suit because of the unusually high standing, harm, and causation requirements of antitrust law, particularly where an innovation is "inchoate at the time the restraint occurs." AREEDA, supra note 35, at~ 1782f.
But, the argument is certainly not without precedent in other contexts of licensing
intellectual property. See Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 911F.2d970, 979 (4th
Cir. 1990) (finding that a copyright licensor's requirement that the licensee of its
software not develop any competing software was an attempt to use its copyright to
violate basic policy of intellectual property law-the development of the arts).
51
See AREEDA, supra note 35 (stating that third parties benefit from nonexclusive grantback clauses because they may license both the original-or dominantpatent and the improvement-or subordinate-patent from any party to the original
license agreement, reducing the cost to enter the market).
52
See generally Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 406-07
(1945) (finding that Hartford-Empire Co. acquired, by issue or assignment, more than
600 patents in the glass-making industry, and restricted the use of its patented technology to outsiders by a network of agreements). See also AREEDA, supra note 35
("To make the improved product ... one needs access to both patents .... While a
third party could negotiate separately with the owners of each patent, transaction costs
typically fall when one party can license both patents."). Grantback clauses may
create a pooling effect whereby one person or entity controls a dominant patent or
patents, and all subsequent improvements filter back to the original patentee. The
Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States suggested that, while pooling
patents is not per se unlawful under antitrust laws, such a practice might be an abusive restraint of the market. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169
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This situation increases the cost of contracting, complicates the negotiation process, and could result in patent license agreements that do
not parallel one another in their scope of use, thus becoming unworkable for the third party. 53
Finally, the last fear of grantback clauses in patent licensing
agreements is the idea that grantbacks "reinforce monopoly." 54 This is
particularly true where the grantback clause assigns any improvement
patents to the patentee and prohibits the licensee from practicing or
disseminating the improvement. This type of grantback clause can be
especially detrimental to the marketplace where the original patent
and improvement patent "compete" with one another, or, stated differently, may be practiced independently. 55 Because a patent is limited
in scope to the language of its claim, 56 a patent limits that to which the
patentee has exclusive rights. Grantback clauses then can extend that
exclusivity beyond what the government has recognized to other innovations through contract. There are justifications for this ownership
expansion articulated by both the United States Supreme Court, discussed below in Part II, and a leading antitrust scholar. 57 But the accumulation of improvement patents by the original patentee may be a
de facto extension of the original patent's expiration date, increasing
the patentee's market share, and erecting a significant barrier to entry
in the particular market. 58 Antitrust law seeks to prohibit or mitigate
such conduct. 59
(1931) ("Any agreement between competitors may be illegal if part of a larger plan to
control interstate markets. Such contracts must be scrutinized to ascertain whether the
restraints imposed are regulations reasonable under the circumstances, or whether
their effect is to suppress or unduly restrict competition. And [patent] pooling arrangements may obviously result in restricting competition.").
53
But this problem is likely not unique to exclusive grantback clauses.
Where a patentee doesn't license its technology at all, and instead relies on in-house
development assisted by the "know-how" of subsidiaries and the capital of investors
or banks, any future licensee would be inundated with vast negotiations with such
third parties who may retain some proprietary or equity interest in the technology.
Thus, while cost of contracting would be an important consideration in the validity of
grantback clauses, it is not unique to grantback clauses.
54
AREEDA, supra note 35; 2 HOLMES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST LAW§ 23:1 (2011).
55
AREEDA, supra note 35.
56
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (2002)
("The claim defines the scope of the patent grant.") (citation omitted).
57
See AREEDA, supra note 35 ("[S]uch cartel or monopolization scenarios
hardly describe the typical grantback and therefore provide no ground for any categorical characterization as patent misuse or antitrust violation.").
58
See id. ("[T]he monopoly may be extended in time or otherwise reinforced
when grantbacks bring the dominant firm an array of subordinate patents that could
compete with each once the original patent expires or that create a thicket of overlap-
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restraints imposed are regulations reasonable under the circumstances, or whether
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s But this problem is likely not unique to exclusive grantback clauses.
Where a patentee doesn't license its technology at all, and instead relies on in-house
development assisted by the "know-how" of subsidiaries and the capital of investors
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ANTITRUST LAW§ 23:1 (2011).
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56
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (2002)
("The claim defines the scope of the patent grant.") (citation omitted).
7
s See AREEDA, supra note 35 ("[S]uch cartel or monopolization scenarios
hardly describe the typical grantback and therefore provide no ground for any categorical characterization as patent misuse or antitrust violation.").
8
s See id. ("[T]he monopoly may be extended in time or otherwise reinforced
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II. HISTORY OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF GRANTBACK
CLAUSES BY THE COURTS AND THE AGENCIES

The Supreme Court first solidly addressed. the permissibility of
grantback clauses in patent license agreements in Transparent-Wrap
Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. ("Transwrap"). 60 The Transparent-Wrap Machine Corporation ("Transwrap") held a series of patents
on a machine that made, filled, and sealed cellophane packages for
candy and other similar articles. 61 Stokes & Smith Company
("Stokes") acquired Transwrap' s business and the right to use its
trademarks, but only obtained licenses on-as opposed to ownership
of-Transwrap's patents. Under the license agreement, Stokes was
required to assign back to Transwrap any improvements it developed
in the use of Transwrap' s patents. 62 Several years after the agreement
was completed, Stokes took out several patents on improvements, but
refused to assign them back to Transwrap. Transwrap sought to collect the patents it had been denied, but when that was unsuccessful,
Transwrap notified Stokes that the agreement was void and would be
unwound. 63 Stokes brought a declaratory judgment action asking that
the grantback provisions be declared illegal and unenforceable, and
that Transwrap be enjoined from terminating the agreement. 64
Judge Learned Hand for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that Transwrap' s grantback provisions were
per se illegal and unenforceable, analogizing the provisions to tying
agreements. 65 Under the antitrust prohibition on tying arrangements,
ping patent claims. New entrants may find such a thicket hard to penetrate, because
fighting a weaker patent may be fruitless when many others remain in force.").
59
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (generally proscribing any contract, combination
or conspiracy that unreasonably restrains the nation's domestic: or foreign trade or
commerce).
60
329 U.S. 637 (1947).
61
Id. at 638.
62
Id. at 638-39.
63
Id. at 639-40.
64
Id. at 640.
65
Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 156 F.2d 198, 202
(2d Cir. 1946). The antitrust doctrine against tying arrangements prohibits a seller
from conditioning the sale of its goods on the purchase, rental, or license of a separate
and distinct good or service. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1958) (defining a tying arrangement as "an agreement by a party to sell one product
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or
at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier."); Int'l
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947) (prohibiting International Salt
Company from conditioning the licensing of its patented salt processing machinery on
the purchase and use of its unpatented salt because "patents confer no right to restrain
use of, or trade in, unpatented salt ... [and] by contracting to close [the] market for
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Judge Hand stated that the grantback provision in question gave the
patentee control over unpatented articles-the improvement patentswhich but for the agreement, it would not possess. 66 Judge Hand relied on a line of Supreme Court cases which established that tying
arrangements using patents as the tying product disturbed public policy and patent laws by endowing the patentee with a monopoly beyond
the scope of its original patent. 67
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit. 68 The Court rightly (in this author's opinion) repudiated Judge
Hand's use of the per se rule, and stated that antitrust consideration of
grant-back clauses in patent licensing agreements should be analyzed
under the rule of reason. 69 In justifying this principle, the Court did
not agree with Judge Hand that a patent grantback was like a tying
arrangement that impermissibly grew the original patentee's monopoly. Instead, the Court stated that it is merely "conceivabl[e]" that a
patent grantback provision "could be employed with the purpose and
effect of violating the anti-trust laws." 70 The court stated that the inquiry, however, must be whether the provision substantially lessens
competition or tends to create an impermissible monopoly. 71 Where
salt against competition, International has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its
patents afford no immunity from the anti-trust laws.") (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)).
66
Stokes & Smith Co, 156 F.2d at 203.
67
Stokes & Smith Co. , 156 F.2d at 201 (relying on Bauer v. O'Connel, 229
U.S. 1, Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, and Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661).
68
Transparent-Wrap, 329 U.S. at 648. Justices Black, Rutledge, Burton and
Murphy would have ruled Transparent's grantback provisions illegal for the same
reasons articulated by Judge Hand below.
69
See id. ("We only hold that the inclusion in the license of the condition
requiring the licensee to assign improvement patents is not per se illegal and unenforceable."). In so holding, the Court disagreed that the expansion of a patentee's
legal monopoly by contract is violative of public policy, and stated that Congress
made all patents assignable for unlimited consideration. Id. at 642. Furthermore,
Judge Hand's analogy of grantback clauses as tying arrangements was weak, according to the Court. While tying arrangements use patent rights to expand the monopoly
power to non-patented products, grantback clauses involve ''using one legalized monopoly to acquire another legalized monopoly." Id. at 644. Thus, a grantback provision is not violative of public policy. See id. at 642-45 ("If Congress, by whose authority patent rights are created, had allowed patents to be assigned only for a specified consideration, it would be our duty to permit no exceptions. But here Congress
has made no such limitation. [The] exclusive right [created by the patent], ... is, for
purposes of the assignment statute, of the same dignity as any other property which
may be used to purchase patents.").
70
Id. at 646.
71
Id. at 647. (The "rule ofreason" is a general inquiry into whether, under
"all the circumstances," the challenged conduct "impos[es] an unreasonable restraint
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II. HISTORY OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF GRANTBACK
CLAUSES BY THE COURTS AND THE AGENCIES
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patents are used to suppress competition through restrictive licensing,
a whole industry may be drawn under the control of one company. 72
Its competitors would winnow out, and "an industrial monopoly
[would be] perfected and maintained." 73 Thus, the Court made the
antitrust inquiry a matter of proof, which meant "that the challenger
must show that the practice is reasonably calculated to create or prolong monopoly power." 74
Transwrap, therefore, stands for the proposition that antitrust review of grantback provisions in patent license agreements should always be under the rule of reason. 75 While Transwrap was a step in the
right direction, the Court missed its chance to push antitrust into a
more effective direction, requiring the legality of grantback provisions
to be assessed based on their particular upstream or downstream market context. Instead, the court merely said that grantback provisions
are not presumptively illegal, thus leaving their legality subject to an
exhaustive and confusing battle under the rule of reason. 76
Subsequent to Transwrap, federal courts have generally followed
Justice Douglas' admonition to use the rule of reason instead of the
per se rule to determine the anticompetitive effects of grantback provisions. Furthermore, the Agencies adopted the Transwrap standard in
the Guidelines. Section 5.6 of the Guidelines addresses grantback
clauses. Similar to the Court in Transwrap, it states that grantback
provisions can have procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and
should be analyzed through the weighing of such effects, paying careon competition."). See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49
(1977) ("[T]he factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.").
·
72
See, e.g., Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 420 (10th Cir. 1952)
(prohibiting attempted monopolization of the hydraulic oil pump industry through the
use of exclusive grantback clauses in patent license agreements); United States~
Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 311 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (finding exclusive grant-:
backs of"inventions still unborn" a prominent tool in illegal horizontal combination).
73
Transparent-Wrap, 329 U.S. at 646-47.
74
AREEDA, supra note 35 at 520.
75
On remand, the Second Circuit, applying the rule of reason, found that
Transwrap's "double monopoly'' did not violate the antitrust laws because the market
extension was not equivalent to an unreasonable restraint of trade. Stokes & Smith
Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 161F.2d565, 567 (2d Cir. 1947).
76
Thomas A. Piraino, Reconciling the Per Se and Rule ofReason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 685, 690 (1991) [hereinafter Reconciling]
("The Court's rule of reason formula requires a weighing of all the circumstances of
each case to determine whether a restraint is legal. This checklist approach puts so
many factors at issue that none is dispositive. The only certainty under the rule of
reason is that courts will be required to engage in a complicated and prolonged investigation into market impact before deciding on the legality of a particular restraint.'.').
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ful attention to any possible reduction of the licensee's incentive to
.
t 77
lllllOVa e.
However, the Transwrap doctrine is hardly uncontroversial, and
while the current iteration of the Guidelines follow its principles, history has indicated unease with the Transwrap decision. In 1964, the
Supreme Court enunciated a ruling that ran directly counter to the
reasoning of the Transwrap decision. In Brulotte v. Thys Co., 78 the
owner of various "hop-picking" patents, the Thys Company, sold machines with corresponding patent license agreements to Brulotte. 79
Under the agreements, Thys Company required Brulotte to pay it royalties for use of the patented machines. Both the agreement and the
required royalties extended beyond the date of Thys Company's patents. 80
Justice Douglas-the same Justice who wrote the majority opinion in Transwrap-held that any attempt by the patentee to continue
its patent monopoly beyond the expiration of the patent is per se unlawful. 81 Justice Douglas analogized Thys Company's royalty agreement to a tying arrangement, a la Judge Learned Hand, and stated,
"[a] patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can
negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage
to project those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tying the
sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented
ones." 82 Several commentators have suggested that this ruling undermines the force of Transwrap. 83
This Note disagrees. Instead, the Brulotte holding comes closer to
capturing the opportunity missed in Transwrap of tailoring the legality of grantback provisions to their particular upstream and downstream context. While the facial holding of Brulotte seems to contradict Transwrap-by stating that a patentee's attempt to extend its mo77
Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 ("Such arrangements provide a means for
the licensee and the licensor to share risks and reward the licensor for making possible further innovation based on or informed by the licensed technology .... [But,]
may adversely affect competition ... if they substantially reduce the licensee's incentives to engage in research and development and thereby limit rivalry in innovation
markets.").
78
379 U.S. 29 (1964).
79
Id. at 29.
80
Id. at 30.
81
Id. 31-32.
82
Id. at 33.
83
E.g. WARDS. BOWMAN, PATENT & ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMICAPPRAISAL232 (1973); Paul G. Chevigny, The Validity of Grant-Back
Agreements Under the Antitntst Laws, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 570 (1966);
Schmalbeck, supra note 35, at 741.
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to be assessed based on their particular upstream or downstream market context. Instead, the court merely said that grantback provisions
are not presumptively illegal, thus leaving their legality subject to an
exhaustive and confusing battle under the rule of reason. 76
Subsequent to Transwrap, federal courts have generally followed
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per se rule to determine the anticompetitive effects of grantback provisions. Furthermore, the Agencies adopted the Transwrap standard in
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(1977) ("[T]he factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
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Transwrap's "double monopoly'' did not violate the antitrust laws because the market
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("The Court's rule of reason formula requires a weighing of all the circumstances of
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reason is that courts will be required to engage in a complicated and prolonged investigation into market impact before deciding on the legality of a particular restraint.").
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nopoly through restrictive licensing clauses is per se illegal-the
holding can also be seen as a narrow evolution on the Transwrap decision: where the license agreement exists in a downstream arrangement, attempts to monopolize, fix prices, or reduce output through the
licensing agreement are per se illegal. Brulotte licensed Thys' technology to "produce" and sell hops, a prototypical downstream activi84
ty. Because Thys sought to advance its royalties on patented technology beyond the patent, it was artificially extending its monopoly
and inflating the price of its technology above what it would go for in
a competitive market without patent protection. Such monopolization
and price inflation by agreement are central prohibitions of Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. 85 Thus, because Thys used a licensing restriction, analogous to a grantback, clause to artificially extend its
monopoly and fix the price of its technology in a downstream arrangement, the per se rule is justified. 86 Thus Brulotte should stand
more clearly for the notion that grantback clauses, and other license
restrictions, may be especially abusive to the marketplace in downstream arrangements, and should therefore be viewed much more
skeptically in that context.
The DOJ voiced further dissatisfaction with the Transwrap decision in the 1960's when it announced that it would seek to upend
Transwrap and establish that "assignment-backs" and "exclusive license-backs" be treated as per se antitrust violations. 87 The DOJ justified this announcement with the "simple reason that [the rule of reason] is much more restrictive than necessary to protect the patentee's

84

Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 29.
Sherman Act§ 1 prohibits any "contract ... in restraint of trade or commerce," such as an agreement to inflate prices above the level that would exist under
healthy competition, and Sherman Act § 2 criminalizes "[ e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of ... trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(2006).
86
As argued below, attempts to monopolize, fix prices, or reduce output in
upstream arrangements are likely much less successful and harmful, and thus do not
warrant per se treatment.
87
See Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 29 AB.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION 187, 188 (1965) ("[W]e shall ... seek to establish, contrary to Trans-Wrap,
that a clause in a patent license requiring the licensee to grant back to the patentee all
future improvement patents should be held unlawful per se for the simple reason that
it is much more restrictive than necessary to protect the patentee's legitimate interests."). In a question-and-answer session after Turner-the Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division-presented his paper, he was asked what kind
of grantback clauses the DOJ thought should be per se unlawful. Mr. Turner responded that only assignment-back and exclusive license-back agreements should be per se
unlawful, and not non-exclusive license-backs. Id. at 192.
85
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legitimate interests." 88 Since that declaration, however, the Agencies
have resolved that grantback clauses should be treated under the rule
of reason, regardless of whether the clauses assign back or exclusively
license back improvement patents, and regardless of whether the
grantback exists in an upstream or downstream context. 89
But simply resorting to the rule of reason is a mistake. As mentioned, the rule of reason can be incredibly burdensome and inexact.
Instead of applying a blanket rule of reason, or even a per se presumption, the courts and the Agencies should follow what Justice Douglas
attempted to do in Brulotte: tailor a sliding-scale analysis to grantback
clauses based on the particular upstream or downstream context in
which the provision exists. The particular problems of a blanket application of the per se rule or rule of reason are discussed in the following section.

III. WHY Do WE EVEN NEED A PER SE AND RULE OF
REASON DICHOTOMY FOR PATENT GRANTBACKS?

In antitrust law, it is regularly argued that determining which rule
to apply in a case-the per se rule or the rule of reason-often settles
the outcome before analysis begins. 90 All conduct that elicits per se
treatment is quite obviously illegal under the antitrust laws, and thus

88
Id. See also Eileen Shanahan, Patent Licensing Will Be US. Antitrust
Target: Justice Aid Sees Civil Actions as a Spur to Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1965, at 31 (stating that Donald F. Turner, the head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, was interested in testing "the legality of ... 'grant-back' provisions of
patent licenses" and that Mr. Turner believed that courts "could hold the very existence of such an agreement is illegal, without requiring the Government to prove that
any harm has been done to competition."); M'Laren Ready for Patent Suit-Tells Bar
Association that Grant-Back's Will Be Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1969, at 67
("[Assistant Attorney General Richard W.] McLaren told a meeting of the antitrust
section of the American Bar Association that [grantback] agreements 'tend unduly to
extend the patent monopoly and to stifle research and development efforts of licensees.").
89
See Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From
Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 11 (2000) ("Today, the federal antitrust
authorities have a more refined view of the likely effect of grantbacks on innovation,
competition, and consumer welfare. Grantback provisions are now evaluated under a
more detailed rule of reason inquiry, in which we examine the likely effects of the
grantback in light of the overall structure of the licensing arrangement and conditions
in the relevant markets.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing TransparentWrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 645-48 (1947)).
90
See Reconciling, supra note 76, at 685 ("The rule ofreason and per se
approaches have been so divergent that a court's choice of one analysis over the other
will usually determine the outcome of an antitrust case.").
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III. WHY Do WE EVEN NEED A PER SE AND RULE OF
REASON DICHOTOMY FOR PATENT GRANTBACKS?
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to apply in a case-the per se rule or the rule of reason-often settles
the outcome before analysis begins. 90 All conduct that elicits per se
treatment is quite obviously illegal under the antitrust laws, and thus
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Id. See also Eileen Shanahan, Patent Licensing Will Be US. Antitrust
Target: Justice Aid Sees Civil Actions as a Spur to Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,

1965, at 31 (stating that Donald F. Turner, the head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, was interested in testing "the legality of ... 'grant-back' provisions of
patent licenses" and that Mr. Turner believed that courts "could hold the very existence of such an agreement is illegal, without requiring the Government to prove that
any harm has been done to competition."); M'Laren Ready for Patent Suit-Tells Bar
Association that Grant-Back's Will Be Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1969, at 67
("[Assistant Attorney General Richard W.] McLaren told a meeting of the antitrust
section of the American Bar Association that [grantback] agreements 'tend unduly to
extend the patent monopoly and to stifle research and development efforts of licensees.").
89
See Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From
Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 11 (2000) ("Today, the federal antitrust
authorities have a more refined view of the likely effect of grantbacks on innovation,
competition, and consumer welfare. Grantback provisions are now evaluated under a
more detailed rule of reason inquiry, in which we examine the likely effects of the
grantback in light of the overall structure of the licensing arrangement and conditions
in the relevant markets.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing TransparentWrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 645-48 (1947)).
90
See Reconciling, supra note 76, at 685 ("The rule ofreason and per se
approaches have been so divergent that a court's choice of one analysis over the other
will usually determine the outcome of an antitrust case.").
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every suit in which the per se rule applies is a win for the plaintiff. 91
Conversely, all conduct that warrants rule of reason treatment either
tends to be tolerable, or litigation becomes so extensive and the plaintiffs burden so heavy 92 that settlement in favor of the defendant becomes likely. 93 In fact, since the Transwrap rule of reason principle
was articulated, the DOJ has never prevailed in a · case involving
grantback provisions alone. 94
Furthermore, since the time Transwrap and its progeny were decided, some federal courts have become discontented with the dichotomy between the per se rule and the rule of reason approach to antitrust matters at large. 95 The per se rule-whether used in a grantback
clause case or otherwise-often gives short shrift to the economic
effects of the challenged conduct. "By mechanically precluding certain conduct without any consideration of its economic effects, the
rule deter[s] beneficial, as well as pernicious, business practices. " 96
On the other hand, a rule of reason analysis can often be unwieldy
because of the extensive competitive inquiry "that exhaust[s] the parties' resources, the courts' time, and the ability of jurors to render
effective decisions." 97 The rule ofreason also fails to give any guidance to businesses trying to conduct themselves lawfully. 98
91
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Id. ("Traditionally, the rule of reason has meant a decision for the defendant and the per se rule a victory for the plaintiff.").
92
The rule of reason often requires that the plaintiff provide in depth economic analysis of the anticompetitive market impact of defendant's conduct, and
reasons why defendant's justifications do not overbalance its anticompetitive effect,
using a multitude of factors, none of which are dispositive. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Vertical Arrangements and the Rule a/Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 153, 155
(1984) ("A global inquiry invites no answer, it puts too many things in issue .... Of
course judges cannot do what such open-ended formulas require. When everything is
relevant, nothing is dispositive."); M. Laurence Popofsky & David B. Goodwin, The
"Hard-Boiled" Rule a/Reason Revisited, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 198 (1987) (describing the application of the rule ofreason as "a long list of factors without any
indication of priority or weight to be accorded to each factor.") (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
93
See Reconciling, supra note 76, at 685 ("Traditionally, the rule ofreason
has meant a decision for the defendant and the per se rule a victory for the plaintiff.").
94
Schmalbeck, supra note 35, at 739. As Richard Schmalbeck points out,
this is due in part because so few cases deal with grantback provisions alone, but
instead "[t]he profusion of issues in these cases has obscured the grant-back issue,
that question often being treated briefly and rather mechanically." Id. (citing United
States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 815-16 (D.N.J. 1949)). See also
AREEDA, supra note 35 at 519 ("Apart from the rare attempt to monopolize, nonexclusive grantbacks are virtually always upheld.").
95
Collaborations , supra note 16, at 1144.
96
Id. at 1145.
97
Id. at 1144.
98
Reconciling, supra note 76, at 690.
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A. Inaccuracy of the Per Se Rule and the Rule of
Reason
The dichotomy between the per se rule and the rule of reason is
not helpful in the context of grantback clauses in patent license
agreements for two reasons. First, the dichotomy often muddles and
confuses the bottom line of the antitrust inquiry. In general, grantback
clauses are unlike other conduct challenged as "contract[s], combination ... or conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade," 99 such as price-fixing,
territorial restraints, or restraints on product out-put. While pricefixing agreements, territorial restraints and restrictions on product
output raise clear anticompetitive concerns, 100 grantback clauses often
have less obvious anticompetitive effects. Grantback clauses can catalyze procompetitive conduct by incentivizing the dissemination of
technology, and encourage innovation by allowing the original patentee to "share in the value of ... future innovations to which it has contributed by providing access to its invention." 101 Price fixing and other
per se illegal anticompetitive conduct does not carry such adjuvant
qualities.
On the other hand, grantback clauses are also unlike prototypical
rule of reason contracts, such as mergers, vertical agreements, or tying
arrangements. Patent license agreements, as stated above, can be
viewed as a form of joint venture in that the parties partially integrate
through the licensing and use of the patented technology to accomplish some new concern. Where such a joint venture does not remove
competition from the marketplace, or does not result in cartelization
or monopolization (as in Brulotte v. Thys Co.), anticompetitive effects
are much less obvious. 102 Mergers, on the other hand, are transactions
resulting in full integration of two companies who are frequently
competitors. A merger may often lead to serious anticompetitive effects if it significantly increases market concentration, opens the door
to coordinated interaction (i.e. oligopolistic behavior) in the relevant
99

Sherman Antitrust Act §1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (holding
that an agreement on the part of the members of a combination controlling a substantial part of an industry which fixes the prices which the members are to charge for
their commodity is in itself an undue and unreasonable restraint of trade); see also
United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding that allocation of territories to
cooperative buying association members in which they had exclusive or de facto
exclusive licenses to sell the association's private-label brands, together with a vetolike power over admission of new members, constituted a horizontal restraint and a
per se violation of the Sherman Act).
101
AREEDA, supra note 35, at ifl 782.
102 Id.
100
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market, or creates entry barriers for new competitors. 103 Vertical
agreements may raise similarly significant anticompetitive effects,
such as boycotting competitors. 104 Thus, grantbacks in patent license
agreements can generally be distinguished from other rule of reason
conduct because their anticompetitive effects are much less serious. In
fact, the Agencies have stated that their main concern with grantback
clauses is the possibility that they will "substantially reduce the licensee's incentive to engage in research and development and thereby
limit rivalry in innovation markets." 105
Courts and the Agencies complicate the issues by using the same
antitrust tests on grantback clauses as those used on price fixing and
horizontal mergers. As the Supreme Court said in California Dental
Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 106 "it does not follow that
every case attacking a less obviously anticompetitive restraint ... is a
candidate for plenary market examination." 107 Instead, the requisite
inquiry is "whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition." 108 The Supreme Court recognized that often the "quality of
proofrequired should vary with the circumstances." 109 As argued below in Part IV, a more tailored approach to grantback clauses that
focuses solely on the upstream or downstream context in which the
grantback clause exists would serve the antitrust bottom line more
efficiently.

B. Special Context of Grantback Clauses in High
Technology Markets

technology and innovation markets have unusual economic features
that make the traditional, unvarying antitrust analysis more difficult
(or even illogical) to apply. 111 This is especially true where intellectual property is the driving force in the market. In fact, Robert Pitofsky,
former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and now Joseph
and Madeline Sheehy Professor of Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Law at Georgetown Law Center, emphasized this point: "High tech,
or more specifically intellectual property markets, are different. The
kind of static analysis that we often have applied in the past . . . is in
fact unlikely to be fully adequate to take high tech into account." 112
Generally, there are two reasons for this difference. First, markets
that are driven by innovation and technology move more rapidly than
other markets. 113 Second, high technology markets "tend to coalesce
around single products that create the standard for an entire industry." 114 "Because of the advantages that will accrue to the 'first mover' to be successful in the network market, there is likely to be fierce
competition among firms for the ultimate winner-take-all position." 115
In many respects, this type of "tipping" 116 can be good for consumers. 117 For example, Microsoft's dominant market position in personal computer operating systems has standardized personal computing such that consumers can rely on the same basic platform in every
personal computer they use, making their work more efficient and
dependable. High technology firms may also be more willing to enter
new markets, or even create new markets, if they see an opportunity to
111

The second reason why the per se and rule of reason dichotomy is
unhelpful in analyzing grantback clauses is that patent license agreements today exist significantly in high technology markets. 110 High
103

See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE CoMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (1997) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines] (describing the various anticompetitive effects a merger can have and thus the need for a full rule of reason analysis
in determining legality) available at
http ://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pd£
104
See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act by alleging that a combination consisting of many manufacturers, distributors, and a competing retailer conspired among themselves either not to sell to plaintiff, or to sell to it
only at discriminatory prices and highly unfavorable terms).
105
Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30.
106
526 U.S. 756 (1999).
107
Id. at 779.
108
Id. at 780.
109 Id.
11
Choi, supra note 33, at 803.
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High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 74. See also Seth Schiesel,
New Economy: Bringing Competition Policy Into the Age of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2000, at Cl ("Many of the analytical and intellectual tools that competition
authorities use these days were developed for slow-changing industries like manufacturing. But these methods may not be up to the task of dealing equitably with technology sectors where the competitive landscape can change significantly from year to
year.").
112
Schiesel, supra note 111, at C3.
113
See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 74 ("High technology
markets are defined by their rapid pace of innovation. Technological breakthroughs
can alter markets almost overnight.").
114
Id. at75-76.
115
Id. at 76.
116
See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. ECON.REV. 157, 169
(describing the "winner-take-all" effect that exists in network markets as a "'tipping'
of the market to a single producer, or a single standard or kind of product.").
117
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging
by Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 16 (1998) ("Consumers, in fact, often
benefit when single [technology] networks come to dominate secondary markets. Not
only can a single network enforce common standards more effectively; it can also
reduce consumers' costs of using the network.").
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dominate that new market. 118 Entering or creating new markets is
good for consumers because it increases available products and services. It also encourages innovation, which is the underlying principle
of patent protection and antitrust's greatest hope in competitive high
technology markets.
Because technology markets evolve more rapidly than other markets, and because a certain level of monopolization in high technology
can benefit consumers more than in other markets, courts and the antitrust regulatory agencies should evaluate high technology contracts or
conspiracies "in restraint of trade" 119 from a different perspective. As
Thomas Piraino correctly points out, overenforcement might discourage firms from significant innovation, while underenforcement might
induce a firm shift from efficient monopolization to counduct that
would injure consumers, such as erecting burdensome entry barriers
for competitors, raising prices, or reducing output. 120
In the context of grantback clauses in patent license agreements,
the extensive rule of reason inquiry is even less necessary. Because
grantback provisions are rarely challenged on their own, but are challenged along with other types of anticompetitive conduct, applying an
extensive rule of reason analysis to the effects of such clauses is unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources.
Instead, courts and the Agencies should assess the legality of
grantback provisions by focusing on the context of the license agreement and grantback provision. Courts and the Agencies should ask
whether the license agreement contemplates an upstream joint venture
(such as through research and development, where the aim is to develop new products or technology) or is for a downstream joint venture (such as a production joint venture, which is closer to the market
and has a greater potential to displace competition and injure consumers). Inquiring into whether the grantback clause exists in an upstream
joint venture or downstream joint venture will do much of the heavy
lifting in determining whether the provision has potential anticompetitive effects.

IV. A MORE NUANCED CONTEXTUAL INQUIRY
A patent licensing agreement is similar to a joint venture. In either
scheme, two or more firms collaborate through licensing agreements
to achieve a specific business objective beneficial to all involved

118
119
120

High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 83.
15 U.S.C. §1 (2006) (Sherman Act§ 1).
High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 76-77.
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firms. 121 Joint ventures can be subdivided for antitrust purposes into
upstreamjoint ventures and downstreamjoint ventures. 122
Upstream joint ventures are those collaborations that focus on
production "inputs" and are furthest from the marketplace. 123 Examples of upstream joint ventures include research and development,
industry standard setting, and joint buying. 124 Within these types of
upstream joint ventures, patent license agreements are most prevalent
in research and development joint ventures.
Downstream joint ventures, on the other hand, focus on produc125
Examples of downstream joint ventures include
tion "outputs."
production joint ventures, marketing joint ventures, and at times, industry standard setting joint ventures. Downstream joint ventures are
closer to the market and the consumer, and thus may be more prone to
anticompetitive conduct, such as removing competition between previously competing firms in the market in which they were already
competing. 126 Within the downstream category of joint ventures, patent license agreements are most likely to exist in production joint
ventures.
There is a difference in analysis between license agreements for
the purpose of research and development, and license agreements for
the purpose of production. The former potentially creates products not
previously available in the market place, whereas the latter may simply be an allowance to produce what others, including the original pa121
See ABAANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 372
(Willard K. Tom et al. eds, 3d ed. 1992) (defining ''joint venture"); DEP'T OF JUSTICE
& FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS 2 (2002) [hereinafter Collaboration Guidelines] (stating that a "'competitor collaboration' comprises a set of one or more agreements, other than merger
agreements, between or among competitors to engage in economic activity, and the
economic activity resulting therefrom.").
122
Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1177, 1182.
123
Id. at 1178 ("[U]pstreamjoint ventures limited to research and development ... or other 'inputs' into the productive process do not affect the parties' decisions on pricing and output."). See also Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the
Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance ofPenn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1007, 1040 (1969) (implying that such joint ventures are not competitive); Walter T.
Winslow, Joint Ventures-Antitrust Problems and Opportunities, 54 ANTITRUST L.J.
979, 983-84 (1985) (noting that research and development joint ventures avoid many
anticompetitive pitfalls).
124
Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178.
125
Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178.
126
See Polle Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.1985) (holding
that a joint venture was lawful where two companies in the home building industry
agreed to form a joint venture which owned and operated a retail store selling each
company's respective wares because the cooperation improved economies of scale,
lowered costs, and did not restrict output in the marketplace).
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119

120

High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 83.
15 U.S.C. §1 (2006) (Sherman Act§ 1).
High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 7 6-77.
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firms. 121 Joint ventures can be subdivided for antitrust purposes into
upstreamjoint ventures and downstreamjoint ventures. 122
Upstream joint ventures are those collaborations that focus on
production "inputs" and are furthest from the marketplace. 123 Examples of upstream joint ventures include research and development,
industry standard setting, and joint buying. 124 Within these types of
upstream joint ventures, patent license agreements are most prevalent
in research and development joint ventures.
Downstream joint ventures, on the other hand, focus on produc125
Examples of downstream joint ventures include
tion "outputs."
production joint ventures, marketing joint ventures, and at times, industry standard setting joint ventures. Downstream joint ventures are
closer to the market and the consumer, and thus may be more prone to
anticompetitive conduct, such as removing competition between previously competing firms in the market in which they were already
competing. 126 Within the downstream category of joint ventures, patent license agreements are most likely to exist in production joint
ventures.
There is a difference in analysis between license agreements for
the purpose of research and development, and license agreements for
the purpose of production. The former potentially creates products not
previously available in the market place, whereas the latter may simply be an allowance to produce what others, including the original pa121
See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 3 72
(Willard K. Tom et al. eds, 3d ed. 1992) (defining "joint venture"); DEP'T OF JUSTICE
& FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS 2 (2002) [hereinafter Collaboration Guidelines] (stating that a "'competitor collaboration' comprises a set of one or more agreements, other than merger
agreements, between or among competitors to engage in economic activity, and the
economic activity resulting therefrom.").
122
Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1177, 1182.
123
Id. at 1178 ("[U]pstreamjoint ventures limited to research and development ... or other 'inputs' into the productive process do not affect the parties' decisions on pricing and output."). See also Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the
Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance ofPenn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1007, 1040 (1969) (implying that such joint ventures are not competitive); Walter T.
Winslow, Joint Ventures-Antitrust Problems and Opportunities, 54 ANTITRUST L.J.
979, 983-84 (1985) (noting that research and development joint ventures avoid many
anticompetitive pitfalls).
124
Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178.
125
Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178.
126
See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.1985) (holding
that a joint venture was lawful where two companies in the home building industry
agreed to form a joint venture which owned and operated a retail store selling each
company's respective wares because the cooperation improved economies of scale,
lowered costs, and did not restrict output in the marketplace).
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tentee, are already producing. This latter type of arrangement might
exist where the patentee is located in one region, say the Northeast,
but wants to expand to another region, say the Southwest, yet lacks
the necessary resources. The patentee can merely license its patented
product to a firm in the Southwest instead of opening up its own production facilities. This section discusses how courts should evaluate
grantback clauses that exist in the context of upstream and downstreamjoint ventures.

A. Grantback Clauses in Upstream Joint Ventures
Grantback clauses in upstream ventures, such as research and development joint ventures should be presumptively legal, unless the
grantback · is exclusive or the original patentee has a monopolistic
market share. 127 Grantback clauses in upstream collaborations generally do not affect the licensee's incentives to engage in research and
development, 128 but instead further incentivize research and development. In other words, but for the grantback clause, the patentee may
not license its technology to others out of fear of being replaced in the
market. Where the patentee can be certain that it will not be replaced
or superseded by improvements created by the joint venture, it is more
likely to license its technology.
Moreover, grantback clauses may be viewed as ancillary restraints
to legitimate upstream joint ventures where they are not exclusive and
overbroad. 129 First, as a normative principal, the law should encourage
research and development joint ventures because of their efficiencies.
127
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The Agencies already use exclusivity and market power in their rule of
reason analysis of grantback clauses, but this Note proposes that a more nuanced
contextual analysis needs to accompany an exclusivity and market power inquiry. See
Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 (stating that the Agencies will evaluate whether a
grantback clause will eliminate or reduce a licensee's incentive to innovate through its
exclusivity, and whether the licensor has market power in a relevant technology or
innovation market).
128
See Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 (holding that the reduction in the
licensee's incentive to engage in research and development, and thereby limit rivalry
in innovation markets, is the key focus of antitrust inquiry into grantback clauses).
129
The doctrine of ancillary restraints was created by Judge Taft when he sat
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). Judge Taft stated, "no convention. al restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee
in the full enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the
dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party." Id. at 282. In other words,
where a restraint on trade is necessary for legitimate and procompetitive business
practices, it will not be struck down as illegal.
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Grantback clauses can be viewed as necessary aids for research and
development joint ventures because of their ability to protect the patentee's interests. 130 As stated above, without the grantback provision,
protecting the patentee's position in the relevant innovation market,
the patentee may be reluctant to enter the joint venture and may look
for alternative avenues for furthering its technology development.
Also, in high technology markets, research and development joint
ventures may be the only tool small techllology firms can use to gain
market power against more dominant firms that have "tipped" the
market. 131 Because a small firm with proprietary technology may be
quickly eliminated from the market if its patented technology is superseded-and it has no rights to that superseding technology-a grantback clause may be a proper method of protecting such small joint
venturers, allowing them to compete with more dominant firms.
Finally, upstream joint ventures generally do not affect the pricing
our output of current products, and thus can have no adverse effect on
the relevant innovation market. 132 Federal courts have long held that a
limitation on output is the key concern in any analysis of contracts or
agreements allegedly in restraint of trade. 133 Upstream joint ventures
generally do not affect output since their focus is not on putting products into the market, but instead is on developing technology that
could be turned into a marketable product, setting standards for an
industry, or purchasing raw materials to be used in production. Use of
a grantback clause by a patent holder in an upstream joint venture
would not shift the joint venture's effect on output from negligible to
consequential. A grantback clause merely requires that the original
patentee have some rights to any improvements developed as a result
of the joint venture.
Thus, grantback clauses in upstream joint ventures should be presumptively legal because they do not restrict others' incentives to innovate, but rather promote industry innovation and dissemination.

°

13
Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1182. Often research and development
joint ventures are entered into because participants "lack the resources to finance a
research and development project independently." Id. Where this is the case, dissemination of technology is facilitated only through the joint venture, since the patentee
cannot develop its technology on its own, and the other parties don't have the patented technology.
131
See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 142 ("Such ventures
often allow smaller firms to participate in research projects in which they lack the
wherewithal to pursue independently.").
132
See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 137.
133
See Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.
1996) ("The core question in antitrust is output. Unless a contract reduces output in
some market, to the detriment of consumers, there is no antitrust problem.").
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joint ventures are entered into because participants "lack the resources to finance a
research and development project independently." Id. Where this is the case, dissemination of technology is facilitated only through the joint venture, since the patentee
cannot develop its technology on its own, and the other parties don't have the patented technology.
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See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 142 ("Such ventures
often allow smaller firms to participate in research projects in which they lack the
wherewithal to pursue independently.").
132
See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 13 7.
133
See Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.
1996) ("The core question in antitrust is output. Unless a contract reduces output in
some market, to the detriment of consumers, there is no antitrust problem.").
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They aid and protect smaller firms in high technology markets in
competing against more dominant firms by encouraging joint ventures. And, they do not limit the output of products entering markets.
Such grantback clauses are ancillary restraints reasonably necessary to
accomplish the efficiencies of the joint venture. 134
A court should only enjoin a grantback clause in an upstream joint
venture if the grantback clause is exclusive 135 and prohibits the licensee from benefiting from improvements. Such a grantback clause may
be a move toward monopolization. Where a grantback clause removes
alienability rights of improvements from the licensee, and funnels any
improvements back under the complete control of the patentee, the
patentee should not be shielded from liability under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act simply because they entered into a legitimate joint venture.136 Attempts to establish a monopoly position in technology markets through the use of grantback clauses and patent pooling have
been held illegal under the Sherman Act on several occasions. 137
Therefore, where an exclusive grantback clause is used in an upstream
joint venture, the legality of the upstream joint venture should not
shield the monopolistic grantback.

134
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See Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1188 ("A court should simply consider whether such restraints are necessary to promote the venture's precompetitive
purposes.").
135
See Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 ("Compared with an exclusive grantback, a non-exclusive grantback, which leaves the licensee free to license improvements technology to others, is less likely to have anticompetitive effects.").
136
See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 138 (stating that a
monopolistic behavior by the parties to a joint venture should not be shielded by the
presumptive legality of the joint venture itself). See also Kobe, Inc. v. Kempsey Pump
Co., 198 F.2d 416 (1952) (attempted monopolization to acquire via exclusive grantbacks in patent license agreements).
137
See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 327 (1947)
("These patents, through the agreements in which they are enmeshed and the manner
in which they have been used, have, in fact, been forged into instruments of domination of an entire industry."); Kobe, Inc., 198 F .2d at 423 ("We think the evidence
warrants the finding that the first ... agreement ... was the beginning of an arrangement to comer the hydraulic pump business for oil wells and that it had that result ...
. Nor do we believe, under the circumstances of this case, that the new organization
can escape the consequences of these arrangements.").

B. Grantback
Ventures

Clauses

in

Downstream
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In the context of downstream joint ventures, grantback clauses are
likely to exist most prevalently in production joint ventures. 138 Production joint ventures are collaborations to produce some good or
product. They are downstream because they are closer to the market
and the customer. 139 A production joint venture can easily regulate
output, as seen in Brulotte v. Thys, and thus has a higher propensity
for being anticompetitive than upstream joint ventures. 140 Because
production joint ventures are frequently the last stop on a product's
journey to the retail shelf, a production joint venture may set prices
for that good above competitive levels or reduce its yield. 141 This type
of behavior is more likely to occur where the producing firm or firms
have monopolistic power in the market. 142
Grantback clauses used in production joint ventures can catalyze
or stimulate monopolistic power and subsequent anticompetitive consequences by limiting independent decision making or centralizing the
control of a key asset-the licensed patent and any future improvements. 143 Therefore, courts and the Agencies should analyze grantback clauses in production joint ventures with greater scrutiny than
similar clauses in upstream joint ventures.
Courts and the Agencies should treat grantback clauses in production joint ventures more cautiously than in upstream joint ventures
because they have the potential of furthering monopolistic or cartelistic behavior in a downstream product. For example, Company A and
138
See, e.g. Nat'! Lead Co., 332 U.S. at 327 (National Lead Co. used its patents in titanium pigments to control and regulate the manufacture and sale of titanium pigments and compounds in the United States) (emphasis added).
139
See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (describing an electric power company's attempt to control the "downstream" retail
market of power supply by refusing to supply power to municipalities that did not
renew the power company's retail franchise contract).
140 Id.
141

See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 121, at 6 ("Competitor collaborations may harm competition and consumers by increasing the ability or incentive
profitably to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below
what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.").
142
See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 543, 547
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that under 15 U.S.C. § 2 (the Sherman Act), a corporation's
unilateral conduct to control an essential facility is not prohibited unless the corporation has the power to eliminate competition in the downstream market and the corporation exercises that power, thus monopolizing the market).
143
See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 121, at 6 (stating that the potential anticompetitive harms of joint ventures may be accomplished by agreements that
"limit independent decision making or combine the control of ... key assets").
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134

See Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1188 ("A court should simply consider whether such restraints are necessary to promote the venture' s precompetitive
purposes.").
·
135
See Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 ("Compared with an exclusive grantback, a non-exclusive grantback, which leaves the licensee free to license improvements technology to others, is less likely to have anticompetitive effects.").
136
See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 138 (stating that a
monopolistic behavior by the parties to a joint venture should not be shielded by the
presumptive legality of the joint venture itself). See also Kobe, Inc. v. Kempsey Pump
Co., 198 F.2d 416 (1952) (attempted monopolization to acquire via exclusive grantbacks in patent license agreements).
137
See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 327 (1947)
("These patents, through the agreements in which they are enmeshed and the manner
in which they have been used, have, in fact, been forged into instruments of domination of an entire industry."); Kobe, Inc., 198 F.2d at423 ("We think the evidence
warrants the finding that the first ... agreement ... was the beginning of an arrangement to comer the hydraulic pump business for oil wells and that it had that result ...
. Nor do we believe, under the circumstances of this case, that the new organization
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See, e.g. Nat'! Lead Co., 332 U.S. at 327 (National Lead Co. used its patents in titanium pigments to control and regulate the manufacture and sale of titanium pigments and compounds in the United States) (emphasis added).
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See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (describing an electric power company's attempt to control the "downstream" retail
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See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 121, at 6 ("Competitor collaborations may harm competition and consumers by increasing the ability or incentive
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what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.").
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See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 543, 547
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that under 15 U.S.C. § 2 (the Sherman Act), a corporation's
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Company B can form a production joint venture where Company A
holds a key patent for a new type of widget that helps automobiles
operate with less fuel, and Company B has the facilities and capital to
produce and ship these widgets to car manufacturers. If the joint venture agreement contemplates that any and all improvements of the
widget developed during the joint venture shall belong to Company A,
then the grantback clause could create or further a monopoly. 144 Company A will hold the exclusive rights to both its original widget and
any improvements that might result from the joint venture.
Such a monopolistic agreement in a downstream venture can very
easily affect price and output since one company is the gatekeeper of a
product and faces no competition. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held this type of behavior to be a clear violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United
Airlines, Inc. 145 The court stated that when a corporation owns an "es146
and has the power to eliminate competition in
sential facility"
downstream markets through the control of that essential facility, the
corporation violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 147 In the above
example, the patent would be an essential facility. Through the grantback clause, Company A could restrict competition in the downstream
market for its widget by denying others, even its joint venture partner,
from independently practicing any improvements on the widget.
Furthermore, even a non-exclusive grantback clause in a production joint venture has the potential to harm competition. Where a
grantback clause contemplates that both the original patentee and the
licensee can independently practice any improvements, or license
those improvements to third parties outside the joint venture, the
grantback clause may facilitate a patent-holding cartel. 148 For example, assume Company A licenses its key widget patent to a joint venture with Companies B and C, who have combined their resources to
produce the widget and sell it to car manufacturers. If the joint venture
144
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Admittedly, this is a straw man argument because this is an exclusive
grantback, which is generally held to be unlawful in most contexts. See Guidelines,
supra note 48, at 30. But, the example is necessary to demonstrate a clear example of
a grantback clause's potential to aid monopolistic behavior.
145
948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
146
An essential facility is a resource that is a requirement of competition and
cannot be easily duplicated. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass 'n. of St. Louis,
224 U.S. 383, 392 (1912) (holding that defendants, who had exclusive control over
railroad terminal facilities in St. Louis through which every train traveling east or
west must pass, violated the Sherman Act by refusing their competitors access to the
terminal on reasonable terms).
147
Alaska Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d at 543 (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).
148
AREEDA, supra note 35, at ifl 782.
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agreement provides that all three companies will have the right to
independently practice any improvements or license those improvements to others outside of the joint venture, with any licensing reve. nue to be shared by all three entities through the joint venture, then
Companies A, B, and C could form a patent-holding cartel.
While this arrangement may be more competitive because it allows the companies to compete with one another outside of the joint
venture by independently practicing any improvements, it may also be
a spring board for cartelization. The three entities could coordinate the
price or output of their independent practice, thereby restricting competition in the market.
Furthermore, such activity would be more difficult for competitors to detect and for the courts and Agencies to enforce if the three
entities do not formally agree on price or output, but instead merely
conduct themselves parallel to one another. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that parallel conduct, without more,
149
In Theatre Enterdoes not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
prise, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., the Court stated,
"this Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior
conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such
150
behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense."
Therefore, because a grantback clause, whether exclusive or nonexclusive, may catalyze or increase the potentiality for monopolistic
or cartelizing behavior in a downstream joint venture, courts and the
Agencies should approach them more skeptically and retain a form of
rule of reason analysis. Such analyses should look to the overall market in which the joint venture exists and ask two key questions. The
first question should analyze the market power of the joint-venturing
firms. This inquiry should be borrowed from the Agencies' horizontal
merger analysis. 151 Where the combined market share of the joining
firms in the relevant product and geographic market is between fifty
and seventy percent, the grantback clause should be analyzed to determine whether its terms are likely to create a monopoly or restrict
price or output through cartelized behavior. Only a non-exclusive
grantback clause would survive this inquiry. An exclusive grantback
clause in such a context should be per se unlawful because its restriction would likely lead to monopolization through patent pool-

149

Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541

(1954).
Id.
See Merger Guidelines, supra note 103, at 15 (detailing the Agencies'
analysis of the market shares of merging firms).
150
151
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agreement provides that all three companies will have the right to
independently practice any improvements or license those improvements to others outside of the joint venture, with any licensing reve. nue to be shared by all three entities through the joint venture, then
Companies A, B, and C could form a patent-holding cartel.
While this arrangement may be more competitive because it allows the companies to compete with one another outside of the joint
venture by independently practicing any improvements, it may also be
a spring board for cartelization. The three entities could coordinate the
price or output of their independent practice, thereby restricting competition in the market.
Furthermore, such activity would be more difficult for competitors to detect and for the courts and Agencies to enforce if the three
entities do not formally agree on price or output, but instead merely
conduct themselves parallel to one another. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that parallel conduct, without more,
does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 149 In Theatre Enterprise, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., the Court stated,
"this Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior
conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such
150
behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense."
Therefore, because a grantback clause, whether exclusive or nonexclusive, may catalyze or increase the potentiality for monopolistic
or cartelizing behavior in a downstream joint venture, courts and the
Agencies should approach them more skeptically and retain a form of
rule of reason analysis. Such analyses should look to the overall market in which the joint venture exists and ask two key questions. The
first question should analyze the market power of the joint-venturing
firms. This inquiry should be borrowed from the Agencies' horizontal
merger analysis. 151 Where the combined market share of the joining
firms in the relevant product and geographic market is between fifty
and seventy percent, the grantback clause should be analyzed to determine whether its terms are likely to create a monopoly or restrict
price or output through cartelized behavior. Only a non-exclusive
grantback clause would survive this inquiry. An exclusive grantback
clause in such a context should be per se unlawful because its restriction would likely lead to monopolization through patent pool-
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(1954).

Id.
See Merger Guidelines, supra note 103, at 15 (detailing the Agencies'
analysis of the market shares of merging firms).
150
151
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152

ing. The Agencies have held that where post-merger market share
of the merged firms makes it the dominant player in the market, unilateral conduct and coordinated conduct can have serious anticompetitive effects on the market. 153 Such effects include ·price-fixing and
reducing output.
Second, courts and the Agencies should ask whether the grantback clause would facilitate barriers to entry by new market en154
trants. Easy entry into a market by new competitors may alleviate
anticompetitive effects of a patent grantback clause because the joint
venturing firms would be hesitant to restrict price or output since a
new entrant could displace them by lowering prices or increasing output. Where the joint venture produces a new product in the market,
entry barriers may be much greater because the patents for the new
product held by the joint venture may be "essential facilities" in the
market. But, where the joint venture produces a product that others
also produce through different technology, market entry may be easier
since a new market entrant can seek to license technology from another firm that is not restricted by the joint venture. A non-exclusive
grantback clause may survive this second inquiry regardless of whether the joint venture produces a new product absent any evidence that it
would facilitate parallel conduct between the joint venturers, such as
sharing profits from licenses to third parties. An exclusive grantback
may survive this inquiry if the joint venture does not produce a new
product, or the new product may be produced by competitors through
equivalent technology that already exists in the marketplace.
CONCLUSION

Grantback clauses in patent license agreements are an important
tool for patent-holders to protect themselves from licensees displacing
them in the market through technological improvements. Yet, grantback clauses may also have anticompetitive effects on the markets in
which they exist because they can reduce licensees' incentives to innovate, and they can lead to patent-holding monopolies or cartels.
Federal courts and the Agencies have analyzed the anticompetitive
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effects of such grantback clauses by mechanically applying either the
155
per se rule or the rule of reason.
But using either rule is deficient for grantback clauses because the
per se rule mischaracterizes the procompetitive effects of grantback
clauses in patent license agreements, and the rule of reason analysis
unnecessarily consumes the resources of the parties, the agencies, and
the judiciary, and gives little guidance to conscientious businesses.
Instead of applying the per se rule or the rule of reason analysis in
their traditional form, courts and the Agencies should tailor their inquiry to the context in which the grantback clause exists. By analogizing patent license agreements to joint ventures, the courts should determine whether the grantback clause exists in an upstream joint venture or a downstream joint venture. Upstream joint ventures, such as
research and development projects, have inherently less anticompetitive effects than downstream joint ventures, and grantback clauses do
not change that effect unless the grantback clause is exclusive. Thus,
non-exclusive grantback clauses in upstream joint ventures should be
presumptively legal, while exclusive grantback clauses should be
scrutinized using traditional market-power analysis.
On the other hand, downstream joint ventures, such as production
joint ventures, have a greater potential for anticompetitive effects in
the relevant market, and grantback clauses may further those effects.
Exclusive grantback clauses in downstream joint ventures may catalyze patent-holding monopolies, and thus should be presumptively
illegal where the joint venture introduces a new product into the market. Non-exclusive grantbacks may encourage patent-holding cartels
through parallel conduct. Such grantback clauses should be scrutinized for their anticompetitive effects. Borrowing from the Agencies'
traditional merger analysis, courts and the Agencies should evaluate
the market share of the joint-venturing firms, as well as the ease of
entry into the market by new competitors. This tailored analysis
would allow courts and Agencies to get to the heart of grantback
clauses' anticompetitive effects more quickly, thus saving the resources usually spent in a full rule of reason analysis, and setting more
clear and understandable precedent.
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See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 67173 (D.S.C. 1977) (prohibiting license agreements that required licensee to license all
improvements back to licensor).
153
Merger Guidelines, supra note 103, at 20-25.
154
Id. at 27-28.
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Although the per se rule has not been applied since Transparent-Wrap
Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., the Department of Justice called for the per se
rule to be reintroduced to grantback clauses in 1960's. See supra notes 79-80 and
accompanying text.
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ing. 152 The Agencies have held that where post-merger market share
of the merged firms makes it the dominant player in the market, unilateral conduct and coordinated conduct can have serious anticompetitive effects on the market. 153 Such effects include· price-fixing and
reducing output.
Second, courts and the Agencies should ask whether the grantback clause would facilitate barriers to entry by new market en154
trants. Easy entry into a market by new competitors may alleviate
anticompetitive effects of a patent grantback clause because the joint
venturing firms would be hesitant to restrict price or output since a
new entrant could displace them by lowering prices or increasing output. Where the joint venture produces a new product in the market,
entry barriers may be much greater because the patents for the new
product held by the joint venture may be "essential facilities" in the
market. But, where the joint venture produces a product that others
also produce through different technology, market entry may be easier
since a new market entrant can seek to license technology from another firm that is not restricted by the joint venture. A non-exclusive
grantback clause may survive this second inquiry regardless of whether the joint venture produces a new product absent any evidence that it
would facilitate parallel conduct between the joint venturers, such as
sharing profits from licenses to third parties. An exclusive grantback
may survive this inquiry if the joint venture does not produce a new
product, or the new product may be produced by competitors through
equivalent technology that already exists in the marketplace.
CONCLUSION

Grantback clauses in patent license agreements are an important
tool for patent-holders to protect themselves from licensees displacing
them in the market through. technological improvements. Yet, grantback clauses may also have anticompetitive effects on the markets in
which they exist because they can reduce licensees' incentives to innovate, and they can lead to patent-holding monopolies or cartels.
Federal courts and the Agencies have analyzed the anticompetitive
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effects of such grantback clauses by mechanically applying either the
155
per se rule or the rule of reason.
But using either rule is deficient for grantback clauses because the
per se rule mischaracterizes the procompetitive effects of grantback
clauses in patent license agreements, and the rule of reason analysis
unnecessarily consumes the resources of the parties, the agencies, and
the judiciary, and gives little guidance to conscientious businesses.
Instead of applying the per se rule or the rule of reason analysis in
their traditional form, courts and the Agencies should tailor their inquiry to the context in which the grantback clause exists. By analogizing patent license agreements to joint ventures, the courts should determine whether the grantback clause exists in an upstream joint venture or a downstream joint venture. Upstream joint ventures, such as
research and development projects, have inherently less anticompetitive effects than downstream joint ventures, and grantback clauses do
not change that effect unless the grantback clause is exclusive. Thus,
non-exclusive grantback clauses in upstream joint ventures should be
presumptively legal, while exclusive grantback clauses should be
scrutinized using traditional market-power analysis.
On the other hand, downstream joint ventures, such as production
joint ventures, have a greater potential for anticompetitive effects in
the relevant market, and grantback clauses may further those effects.
Exclusive grantback clauses in downstream joint ventures may catalyze patent-holding monopolies, and thus should be presumptively
illegal where the joint venture introduces a new product into the market. Non-exclusive grantbacks may encourage patent-holding cartels
through parallel conduct. Such grantback clauses should be scrutinized for their anticompetitive effects. Borrowing from the Agencies'
traditional merger analysis, courts and the Agencies should evaluate
the market share of the joint-venturing firms, as well as the ease of
entry into the market by new competitors. This tailored analysis
would allow courts and Agencies to get to the heart of grantback
clauses' anticompetitive effects more quickly, thus saving the resources usually spent in a full rule of reason analysis, and setting more
clear and understandable precedent.
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